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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an overview of the role of the state in ew Zealand's 
electricity industry. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the states gradual 
process of gaining absolute control and then subsequently developing the industry. Part 
one ends with a more detailed look at the policies of the National government from 1975 
till 1984. The purpose of this part is to present an overview of the development of the 
industry and to provide a context for future reforms. ew Zealand's regulatory 
environment and the electricity industry were quite different to what they are today. Part 
two will look at New Zealand's experience of economic liberalisation and what this has 
meant for the electricity industry. This will consider how these policies were 
implemented and specifically what this meant for the structure of the industry. It will also 
consider events that would undermine the predictions that the free market would provide 
the best possible electricity supply for the New Zealand public. The third part will look at 
the approach of governments since 1999. This essay argues that this is marked change in 
general policy that is illustrated by events in the electricity industry. This paper argues 
that this change rejects the ideological approach of the previous 15 years and replaces it 
with pragmatic solutions to problems in the electricity industry. This change in direction 
has been heavily influenced by New Zealand's experience ofliberalised industries. 
Approximately 15,000 Words. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This essay traces the states changing role in New Zealand's electricity industry. 
Electricity has been used in New Zealand since the late l 800's and the state has been 
heavily involved for almost this entire period. This essay will present the role of the state 
in three broad parts. The first part is from the late l 800's until 1984. This is the 
development of and then complete control of the industry by state. It will focus 
particularly on the Muldoon government from 1973 till 1984. The second part of this 
essay will focus on the period from 1984 till 1999. This was a period of massive reform 
for New Zealand. This essay will look at New Zealand's experience of economic 
liberialisation and what this has meant for the electricity industry. Particularly it will 
consider how the reforms were implemented despite widespread public resistance. The 
third part of the essay begins with 1999 and focuses on the recent decision to implement 
an Electricity Commission and this Commissions role in security of supply. This essay 
argues that this is a marked change in direction from previous reforms and attempts to 
explain what has influenced this change. 
II THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ZEALAND ELECTRIC INDUSTRY. 
A Early Development of the Electricity Industry 1860-1918. 
New Zealand in the late 1800's was England's newest colony. It was in dire need 
of investment and development in order to establish its economy. Despite the 
undeveloped nature of the country it quickly began using electricity. The first recorded 
use of electricity was for a private telegraph line that ran between Dunedin and Po11 
Chambers in 1862. The new technology was quickly placed under state control with the 
Elechic Telegraph Act 1865 establishing central control over electric telegraphs under 
the Electric Telegraph Department. 1 Electricity as a power source took longer to develop. 
1 John E Ma11in (ed) People Politics and Power Stations (EC Zand the Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington 1998) 15. 
Early repo11s of electricity use began to appear in the late 1870's. This included a game 
of soccer played under floodlights at the Basin Reserve in 1879, the Union Steamship 
Company of New Zealand's ship the "SS Manapouri" use of electric lights in 1881, 
(either the first or second merchant boat in the world to have electric lights/ and the 
Bullendale mine having an electric generator in 1884.3 As with telegraphs the 
government stepped in to take control of this new technology. The Electric Lines Act 
1884 prohibited the erection of power lines for public supply without special legislation. 
While this Act was important in the governments control of the industry more effective 
control would come with the Municipal Corporations Act 1886. The Act gave local 
authorities the sole right to use waterpower to generate electricity and supply it's citizens 
with electric power. Private companies could only supply electricity publicly under a 
special Act of parliament.4 This section would provide the means for most of the early 
development of the electricity supply. In 1888 Reefton became the first New Zealand city 
to have a public supply of electricity. English entrepreneur and electrician Walter Prince 
brought a small one Kilowatt demonstration unit which was used to light the Dawson 
hotel in 1886. By early 1888 Reefton had built itself a permanent power station that was 
used to light the whole town. 5 
In 1881 three private Acts were passed to al1ow the private development of an 
electricity supply in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The Acts gave each of the 
city councils the right to purchase the privately built generating plant after ten years. In 
1889 Wellington became the first major center to have an elect1icity supply.6 Auckland 
would take a further 18 years to get a public electricity supply. Despite widespread 
control over the ability to generate electricity the national legislature had not yet begun 
any infrastructure development. 
2 eil Rennie Power to the People, JOO years of Public Electricity Supply in Nell' Zealand. (Bookprint 
Consultants Ltd , Wellington, 1989) 13. 
3 Peter M. Chamber and Ron C. Hall Let There Be Light: A HistOI)' of the Bullendale and the Generation of 
Electric Power in Central Otago. (Central Otago ews Ltd, Alexandra 1986) 23. 
4 eil Rennie Power to the People, I 00 years of Public Electricity S11pp(1· in New Zealand. (Bookprint 
Consultants Ltd , Wellington, 1989) 34. 
5 John E Martin (ed) People Politics and Power Stations (EC Zand Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington 1998) 15 . 
6 Rennie, above, 36. 
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As the tum of the century approached the government began to realise the 
importance of electricity and that they were the only entity large enough to develop the 
new technology nationally. The government moved to take secure control over New 
Zealand's water resources. They passed a series of Acts7 cumulating in the Water Power 
Act 1903 decisively vesting in the crown the right to use water for electricity generating 
purposes. 8 Importantly under this Act these powers could only be delegated to local 
authorities, not to private individuals. 9 It was these Acts that were to form the main basis 
for future intervention in the electricity industry. The Acts severely limited the role of 
private enterprise that had been central to the industries early development up till this 
point. 
The Public Works Amendment Act of 1908 was the first formal statement that the 
government was to have a key role in the construction of generation capacity. Even at 
this time the government did not have the funds to develop this new resource. The Acts 
attempt to have strict controls over the new technology was watered down by the ability 
to issue private licenses to individuals to construct hydro schemes. 10 Even with this 
ability the early development was extremely slow and by 1910 the government had 
decided that it was their sole role to fully develop the industry. 11 The government passed 
the Aid to Water Power Act 1910 that gave them the power to borrow to fund hydro 
development. This lead to the states first major construction of a power generator in New 
Zealand. The Coleridge Power Station began constrnction in 1911 and was opened in 
1914 by then Prime Minister Bill Massey. 12 With this also came two 66kV transmission 
lines into Christchurch. These were completed in 1914 and at 1 OOK.m were the largest of 
their kind in New Zealand. From this point on the government became the main generator 
and supplier, developing a national grid to supply large consumers. The Power Boards 
7 See also the Public Works Act 1882, Mining Act 1886 and the Electric Motive Power Act 1896. 
8 Waitangi Tribunal The Whanganui River Report : Wai I 67 ( et Version , 1999) 325. 
9 Rennie, above, 34. 
10 Public Works Act 1908, s 5. 
11 Waitangi T1ibunal Te Jka Whenua Rivers Report : Wai 2 I 2 ( et Version , 1998) 43 . 
12 The Institution of Professional Engineers ew Zealand lake Coleridge Power Station (Web-page) See 
http: //www.ipenz.org.nz/heritage/itemdetail.cfm?itemid=58 last accessed 15 September 2003. 
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Act 1918 established the Power Boards as the main retailers. 13 These elected boards were 
the sole suppliers of electricity, charging one standard price to rural and urban users. The 
mastermind behind the Power Boards, Alex Wyllie Rodger, ultimate aim was that rural 
woman should have the same electric benefits as their urban counter-parts. 14 This 
established electricity as a utility, it was something that was provided as a state service, 
not a commodity to be brought or sold. By 1919, there were 64 supply authorities, most 
of which were operated by borough councils. 15 These supply authorities all acted 
independently and even at this stage some districts were still without an electrical 
supply. 16 
The decision to implement total state control over the electricity industry was not 
unusual for the time. New Zealand largely followed the English legislature who had 
placed the electricity industry under government control citing safety concerns. 17 Even 
without this influence it was likely that the New Zealand state would have intervened. 
The Liberal government that held power from 1981-1912 was considered to be extremely 
interventionlist. 18 Policies at this time were formed on an ad hoe basis as situations 
arose, more often than not by implementing state control. 19 The general regulation levels 
were so high that one description of New Zealand at the time was that it was practicing 
"socialism without doctrines."2° Faced with a new industry that looked to be extremely 
important for New Zealand's future economic well-being it would be expected that the 
state would become heavily involved. 
13 Waitangi Tribunal Te !ka Wh enua Rivers Report: Wai 2 l 2 (Net Version, 1998) 43. 
14 Neil Rennie Power to th e People, JOO years of Public Electricity S11pply in New Zealand. ( Bookprint 
Consultants Ltd, Wellington, 1989) 95. 
15 John E Martin (ed) People Politics and Power Stations (ECNZ and the Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington 1998) 71. 
16 M Speer Th e Electrical S11pply Industry in New Zealand (Electtical Supply Authorities Association of 
New Zealand, 1962) 61 . 
17 Martin , above, 37. 
18 David Hamer The New Zealand liberals: The Years of Power 1891-1912 (Auckland University Press 
1988) 
19 W.P. Reeves, State Experiences in Australia and New Zealand. 1, Melbourne, 1969 (Facsimile reprint of 
1923 edition) 73. 
20 Andre Metin , Socialism Without Doctrine, (Sydney, 1977) (Translation of l e Soc,a/isme Sans Doctrines, 
1901) . CJ Andre Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand, (1982) reprint of 1914 edition. 
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B. Development of a Mature System 
The government's decision to invest in electricity infrastructure was put on hold 
during World War I as labour resources and government capital were diverted to the war 
effort. For example, while feasibility studies to build a hydro station on the Mangahoe 
River began in 1906 and a decision to build was made in 1915, construction did not start 
until 1920.21 With World War I ending in 1919 the government continued to build plants 
to supply electricity across New Zealand. The use of electricity would grow by over 
350% in the 1920's.22 The government responded by investing in the construction of 
several large hydro stations on the Waikato River and in the South Island. Even at this 
time the government was the only entity in New Zealand with the capital to undertake the 
program.23 This pattern with state as builder of generation plant and sole supplier of 
electricity continued with little disruption until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
The outbreak of World War II created another stall in the development of the 
electricity industry. The war again lead to labour and coal to be in short supply with a 
series of coal strikes emphasised the latter.
24 Demand soon outstripped supply and the 
Electricity Emergency Regulations were issued under the Emergency Regulations Act 
1939. These regulations created the office of electricity controller who had wide powers 
over electricity including the power to allocate electricity to Power Boards.25 This power 
was often used with power restrictions soon becoming a daily occurrence. The extent of 
the problem can be highlighted by a two-day relaxation of lighting reshictions introduced 
as a celebration of Victory in Europe. These celebrations were quickly followed by the 
2 1 Todd Energy Mangahao Power Station (Website) see 
http ://www .todd .co.nzJte/pages/main/corporate/mangahaoh ydro .htm last accessed 25 September 2003. 
22 John E Manin (ed) People Politics and Power Stations (EC Z and the Hi storical Branch , Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington 1998) 123. 
23 Neil Rennie Power to th e People, l 00 years of Public Electricity Supply in New Zealand. ( Bookprint 
Consultants Ltd, Wellington , 1989) 68 . 
24 Jenni fer King Sign of Service: A Jubilee 1/istory of th e Auckland Power Board. (Wilson and Honon 
Limited, Auckland 1972) 3 1. 
25 John E Martin (ed) People Politics and Poll'er Stations (EC Z and the Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington 1998) 128. 
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Electricity Controller calling for general economy and rotating power cuts.
26 The 
restrictions did not end with the war. Power cuts still occurred up till 1947 and further 
restrictions remained for another five years after this.27 These restrictions were taken 
seriously and included inspectors who had the power to enter homes "at reasonable 
times" and disconnect appliances being used in breach of the restrictions. On the 1 April 
1953 the government lifted the restrictions and consumers could use as much electricity 
as they pleased. In the same year the Power Boards announced their first modest price 
increase ever. For 33 years the Power Boards had absorbed all price increases in bulk 
electricity prices.28 
The new found freedom of unlimited electricity was short lived. By 1955 there 
were new shortages and the government cut supply to authorities by 11 %.29 The stall in 
investment during World War II had meant that growth in electricity demand had not 
been matched by a growth in supply. New Zealand simply lacked the base capacity to 
supply its population. This lead to the North Island Power Supply Committee being set-
up to forecast power supply and demand trends for the next decade. Much to the relief of 
the industry the government followed the committee's recommendations and embarked 
on a 7-year plan that included a Waikato coal plant and a Wellington Gas plant. This plan 
took time to have an effect, while 1957 was described as a year "virtually without 
restrictions" this was followed by a year that required the most sever restrictions without 
power cuts ever.30 It would take until 1962 before generation would catch up with 
demand. 31 
From this point on the electricity industry fell into a familiar pattern. The 
government was practically the sole generator. It sold power to supply authorities that 
26 N M Speer The Electrical Supply Industry in New Zealand (Electrical Supply Authorities Association of 
ew Zealand, 1962) 35. 
27 Speer, above, 41 . 
28 Nei I Rennie Power to the People, I 00 years of Public Electricity Supply in New Zealand. ( Bookprint 
Consultants Ltd, Wellington, 1989) 197. 
29 Speer, above, 45. 
30 Jennifer King Sign of Service: A Jubilee History of the Auckland Power Board. (Wilson and Horton 
Limited , Auckland New Zealand 1972) 50. 
31 Rennie, above, 166. 
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then sold it to customers. A few very large users received direct supply from the 
government. The supply authorities were statutory monopolies over a geographical area 
in which they had the sole right and obligation to supply electricity. This was still a 
period of large-scale development. Power Boards in particular found themselves 
undertaking large development projects in order to meet supply. 32 
While the supply of electricity stabilised in the l 960 's electricity remained a 
public focus. In the l 960's the government made an agreement with Camalco to build an 
aluminum smelter at Taiwai point and power stations at Manapouri and Te Anua. The 
government took over the obligation to build the power stations in 1963 . The original 
plans involved raising the lake levels of Te Anau and Manapouri by up to 30 Meter's. As 
construction progressed it quickly became apparent that this would spell ecological 
disaster for the area around the lakes. 33 By 1969 the effect of raising lake level was 
hitting national headlines and by 1970 the "Save Manapouri" campaign had attracted 
264, 907 signatures. This was close to 10% of the population at the time. In 1972 Norman 
Kirk was elected with a platform that included a strong endorsement of the "Save 
Manapouri" ideals. The government confirmed that lake levels would not increase as 
much as first proposed and created the Guardians of Lake Manapouri, Monowai and Te 
Anau. This was a group a six independent individuals whose brief was to oversee the 
management of lake levels. Protection of the lakes was eventually passed into law. The 
Manapouri-Te Anau Development Amendment Act was passed in 1981 setting guidelines 
for lake levels. 34 This campaign is considered the beginning on New Zealand's 
environmental consciousness and activism. For the electricity industry this was to trigger 
the beginning of systems to protect the environment that would take a much wider view 
of the impact of major engineering works . 
32 Rennie, above, 167. 
33 A.F Mark Integrating Conservation With Hydro- Electric Development of lakes /v!anapouri and Ta 
Anau, New Zealand: an Exercise in Complexity. (Botan y Department, University ofOtago) 4. 
34 John E Martin (ed) People Politics and Power Stations (EC Zand the Histori ca l Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington 1998) 21 7. 
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C. The Muldoon Years. 
ational was elected after the incumbent Labour party la ted only one term. The 
Labour government was unable to survive two major economic crises ' that changed ew 
Zealand's economy forever. First, England joined the European Economic Community 
(EEC). With this move New Zealand lost it's assured market for meat, wool and dairy 
products. This was an arrangement that had funded New Zealand's economy for much of 
the 201h century. To make matters worse England also joined the EEC's Common 
Agriculture Program. This provided subsidies for farmers and artificially high guaranteed 
prices. New Zealand had not only lost its assured market but was now trying to compete 
with subsidised European meat. In the 15 years after 1973 Britain changed from a net 
importer of meat and diary products to a need exporter.35 The traditional basis of New 
Zealand's economy had just been severely undermined. The second crisis came with the 
1973 oil shock. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries began to limit the 
supply of oil to world markets. Between January 1973 and January 1974 the price of a 
barrel of oil went from $US2.59 to $US 11.65. This price hike came when oil was our 
biggest single import. The oil shock had a profound effect globally and lead to a crash in 
buoyant commodity prices. New Zealanders found its main export had lost its primary 
market, their income had halved and the price of our main import had quadrupled.
36 New 
Zealanders were faced with the prospect that their standard of living may be dropping for 
the first time in history. There is a general consensus among commentators that 1974 
marked a significant turning point in New Zealand ' s economic history. The post war 
boom period that lasted from 1945-73 and brought full employment, high profitability 
and low inflation gave way to economic stagnation, high inflation, balance of payment 
deficits and the highest unemployment rate since the great depression.37 Muldoon came 
back to office realising the problems ew Zealand was facin g, stating after the election 
"the time has come for ew Zealanders to take a deliberate cut in our standard of living 
35 Neil Rennie Power to th e People, I 00 years of Public Electricity Supply in New Zealand. ( Bookprint 
Con sultants Ltd , Wellington , 1989) 197. 
36 Renni e, above, 197 
37 Jon Johansen, Political Leadership in New Zealand. (VUW 2002) 172. 
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in the interest of future solvency."3~ Despite this statement there would be little done to 
restructure the economy in the next 9 years. 39 
Muldoons term was characterised by extremely high levels of government 
intervention . The economy was protected by large tariffs and subsides, when inflation 
started to rise it was combated by a price freeze and then subsequently a wage freeze.
40 
State departments were huge organisations that ran anything from social welfare to 
forestry. The departments were often used to implement ad hoe political policies and 
were usually grossly inefficient at providing their core function . Richard Prebble later 
stated that when he first became minister of State Owned Enterprise ' s (SOE's) every one 
of these departments ran at a loss, collectively they only produced only 10 percent of the 
countries output despite having 20 percent of the investment.4 1 Electricity was the 
epitome of this model. Electrocorp (ECNZ) controlled generation and transmission and 
was supervised by the Department of Energy, Electricity Division (NZED). This 
Department was formed in 1978 from the formerly independent Department of Electricity 
and Mines and the small policy body, the Ministry of Energy Resources.
42 The 
department was used for a variety of often-contradictory policy goals. Investment 
decisions were often made for political reasons rather than for electricity needs. ECNZ 
controlled 97% of generation and set the price of bulk electricity.
43 Its monopol y was 
entrenched by the Electricity Act 1968, which provided that all other hydro generators 
must hold a government issued license except ECNZ.
44 Retail was by Electricity Supply 
Authorities (ESA) . Usually these were either Municipal Electric ity Departments in urban 
areas or Electric Power Boards in rural areas. The Municipal Energy Departments were 
38 Paul Dalzeil and Ralph Lattimore. The New Zealand Macroeconomy: A Briefing on the Reforms. (Oxford 
Uni versity Press, Auck land , 1999) 16. 
39 Johansen, above, 176 
40 Bri an Easton The Commercialisa tion of New Zealand (A uckland ni ve rsity Press, Auck land , 1997) 7. 
4 1 Ri chard Prebbl e / 've Been Th inking (Seaveiw Publishing, Wellington, 1996) 7 and 23. 
42 All an Bollard, Robe11 Buckle Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand (A llen & Unwen Ltd, ew 
Zea land , 1987) 154. 
43 Geraldine Baumann, Brya nt Gunderson and Quentin Hay "The Contractual Matri x in a Deregulated 
Elec tri city Industry" Conference of the Electric Power Supply industry (Volume 2, Chri stchurch, 19-23 
September 1994) 122. 
44 Elec tri city Act 1968, s20. 
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run through the trading arms of local governments under the ambit of the Local 
Government Act 1974. The Power Boards were mainly rural based and run under the 
Power Boards Act 1925. The ESA's were required to buy electricity from ECNZ unless 
there was a specific government exemption.45 These boards did not operate for profit and 
generally saw their role as having a large social service aspect. Generally this lead to 
commercial users subsidising domestic users. 46 For example, in the year ended March 
1984, domestic p1ices were 4.70 cents per kWh, while the commercial price was 7.54 
cents per kWh. 47 
National 's approach to the economy was a combination of Keynesian economics 
and ad hoe state intervention. Keynesian economics was used to justify government 
borrowing to help balance the economy. The basis of this view was that an increase in 
government spending would kick-start the economy and lead to growth.
48 When the 
second oil shocks hit in 1979 these policies lead directly to the "Think Big" projects as a 
mechanism for recovery.49 The term "Think Big" was a term originally applied to a group 
of large energy based investments. 50 These projects had a dual role, the first was to 
decrease New Zealand's dependence on foreign fuel sources. The second role was to 
revitalise New Zealand's floundering economy. The government would promote (and 
usually protect) big, capital intensive industries that would then drag the rest of the 
economy into a process of sustained self-generating growth. 51 In the energy sector this 
lead to the building of the Synfuel plant and the Clyde Damn. 52 The former of these 
required the government to pay for it to be taken off its hand's; the later ran hugely over 
its construction budget and required legislation to overturn an environment court ruling in 
45 Electricity Act 1968, s 26. 
46 Russel McGeorge "An Overview of the Refom1 of the Electricity Industry" Conference of the Electric 
Power Supply lnduslly (Yolumne I, Christchurch, 19-23 September 1994) 174. 
47 Energy Data File January J 999, Ministry of Commerce, p. I 18. 
48 Roger Douglas Unfinished Business Random House New Zealand, Auckland, 1993) 21. 
49 eil Rennie Power to the People, I 00 years of Public Electricity Supply in New Zealand. ( Bookprint 
Consultants Ltd, Wellington, 1989) 197. 
50 Subsequently the term would be used to describe virtually any large-scale investment drive mooted for 
the early eighties 
51 Brian Easton The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland 1997) 18. 
52 Peter Kammler "Think Big Mark Two. The Electricity Version" ( I O February 1995) The independent 
Auckland, 7. 
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order to proceed. ) The projects "'ere almost without exception considered a failure. 
These failures would subsequently be blamed on the Muldoon government ' s 
mismanagement. This was not without justification, however the failure of the projects 
was actually caused by a mix of reason 's some foreseeable, some not. For example one 
problem was that the New Zealand construction industry was too small to attempt to 
build these projects all at once, a situation that was clearly foreseeable. 54 Another 
example points out that the projection for the Synfuel plant to be profitable required the 
price for a drum of oil to be around $25, this was below the expected price oil would fall 
back to after the oil shocks. 55 When prices unexpectedly fell to below $20 the Synfuel 
plant was a failure. This does not mean the decision to build the plant in the first place 
was not prudent. 56 In future years reasons that were not foreseeable tended to be 
overlooked and the projects were used as an example of government's inability to make 
investment decision's. The energy sector provided other losses around this time. A joint 
venture between the government and the private sector lead to the Maui gas field coming 
on line in 1979. As part of the deal the government undertook to buy a significant amount 
of the gas annually. The government had planned to use this gas to fuel a series of 
thermal plants in the upper North Island. Unfortunately electricity demand was 
overestimated and two of the expected power plants were not built. The government was 
left with a having to pay substantial amounts for gas it had not used .57 This was added to 
the list of energy failures from around this period. The projects massive expense meant 
that the positives from this era are often overlooked. Both the Maui deal and the Clyde 
Dam were expensive, however it should be noted that Maui has provided gas at 
artificially low prices since 1979 and that the Clyde Dam still operates as a major 
· 58 generation asset. 
53 Clutha Deve lopment (C lyde Dam) Empowe rin g Act 1982 
54 Brain Easton , above, 19. 
55 Jon Johansen, Political l eadership in New Zealand. (V UW 2002) 19. 
56 Brain Easton , above, 19. 
57 James Willi s The Maui Gas Contract, a Brief I listo,y. (Be ll Gull y Publi cati ons, 1998) see 
http ://www.be ll gull y.com/publi cations/encr 1998 03 maui_gas .html las t accessed 25 September 2003. 
58 Denni s Welch " Po we r Without Responsibility" (April 19-25 2003) The listener, 18. 
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The "Think Big" failures added to criticism about Muldoon's economic 
approach . 59 A 1981 Treasury report warned the Prime Minister that his existing 
framework would simple not work. 60 The prime minister rejected this outright. Muldoon 
increasingly found himself with few supporters of his economic style, whilst he was still 
dealing in the monetary policy of Keynes his officials were increasingly advocating 
neoclassical idea ' s along the line ' s of Adam Smith ' s invisible hand .61 The failure of the 
"Think Big" projects would add to the validity of these views in the next few years. 62 
The Muldoon era ended in a snap election in 1984. There had been speculation of 
this for some time and the event was eventually triggered by a report that National MP 
Marilyn Waring was ready to resign from the National party and declare herself an 
independent if the government tried to force her to oppose Richard Prebble's no nuclear 
bill.63 The National government suffered its worst result since the inception gaining only 
35.9% of the vote. Despite this result Muldoon refused to step down . In the two-week 
period before the writs were returned the Labour government requested that Muldoon 
devalue New Zealand's dollar. Initially he refused and only stepped down when it 
appeared the Governor General would step in . His refusal to devalue the dollar lead to a 
massive run on the foreign currency with the reserve bank virtually is exhausting its 
foreign reserves. 64 National had not attempted any of the refo1ms that they had indicated 
were required. New Zealand ' s economy was growing poorly and faced a public debt of 
around $21 .9 billion or 64.7% of the national GDP.65 The electricity industry ended this 
era as one of the countries huge state departments. It was almost seen as a leach on the 
state and part of the problem that caused almost $22 Billion dollars in public debt. Like 
the rest of the economy the electric industry was soon to face massive reform. 
59 Ewen McCann The influence of American Economics on New Zealand Thinking and Policy. (The 
Fullbright Seminars) (Platform Publishing I 989 Wellington ) I I 9. 
60 Treasury Economic Strategy: An Overview (G P P1int, Wellington, I 98 I) 
61 Ri chard Prebble J've Been Thinking (Seaveiw Publi shing, Wellington, 1996) 2 I. 
62 Bri an Easton Th e Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland Uni ve rsity Press, Auckland I 997) 20. 
63 Roger Douglas Toward Prosperity. (David Bateman Ltd . Auckland , I 987) 39. 
64 Roger Douglas, above, 5 I . 
65 Paul Heath Q.C "Consumer Bankruptcies, A New Zea land Perspecti ve" ( I 999) See 
http://www.yorku .ca/ohlj/ PDFs/37. I .2/heath.pdf Last Accessed 28 May 2003 
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III THE LIBERALISATION PROGRAM 
This part of the essay traces the period from 1984 through to 1999. It 's presents the 
basics of New Zealand's liberalisation program and what this meant for the electricity 
industry. It presents the view that over this period there was an overriding aim of a few 
key Ministers, business leaders and Treasury to move the electric industry from a 
government owned and protected industry into a competitive, privately owned free 
market. 
A Labour's Liberalisation Program. 
The Labour party returned to power in 1984 knowing the economy was in 
desperate need of reform. The Labour reform process proceeded rapidly and initially 
faced little opposition, as political actors distanced themselves from Muldoon's policies 
they had little choice but to accept the free market reforms. The electricity industry was at 
the centre of this. Its current structure was the antithesis of free market efficiency, its 
industries bloated and statutorily protected. It was an industry that was prime for the 
introduction of free market reform. 
When the fourth Labour government announced its cabinet Roger Douglas was 
made Minister of Finance with David Caygill and Richard Prebble as associate Ministers. 
Treasury had, for the first time in almost a decade, found an ally in the Minister of 
Finance position. Treasury predicated this; the 1984 briefing to the incoming government 
Economic Management set out the blueprint for the reform process .66 These three 
ministers and Treasury would provide the initial power base of the libe1isalisation 
program. This program was based on the neoclassical Laissez Faire economics that had 
increasingly found favour towards the end of Muldoons term as p1ime minister.
67 The 
document outlined the poor performance of state run businesses and blamed this on an 
66 Treasury Economic Management (Wellington 1984) 
67 Brian Easton The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland 1997) 20. 
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absence of clear objectives, a lack of adequate performance monitoring and distortions in 
their operating market. 68 The document proposed efficiency through the market. 69 The 
drive behind the reforms was that forces of enterprise, self-interest and competition 
would generate efficiency and subsequently economic growth. 70 Wherever possible 
government organisations should be run like a business. For electricity this would be the 
beginning of a fundamental policy shift towards treating electricity like a commodity and 
increasingly exposing the industry to market forces. 7 1 
Initially the liberalisation process went unchallenged inside the Labour party, this 
is unusual for a party that has traditionally been more interventionist than others . The 
initial lack of internal conflict over the reforms was likely to have been caused by a 
combination of the "Think Big" failures, the failure of Muldoon's economic policies 
generally and a lack of understanding about the implications of the reforms. The Labour 
government had used the failure of "Think Big" and Muldoon's policies to get back into 
power. Once there the government had to be careful that it was not seen to be advocating 
policies that looked to be continuing Muldoon's approach .72 The suggested policies of 
less state intervention with an underling philosophy of market efficiency were the 
opposite of Muldoons ad hoe state interventionalism. The Economic Statement of 1995 
set out the principles for corporatisation of state departments. Non-commercial functions 
would be shifted to other state agencies, they would be given strict commercial goal's, 
there would be no advantage given to these state businesses over any other and they 
would run under commercial directors from the private sector. 73 This policy was 
implemented with the State Owned Enterprise Act 1986. Wherever possible the State 
Depaiiments were turned into State Owned Enterprise's (SOE 's). The Act required that 
the principle objective of any SOE was to run as a successful business, all social policy 
68 Alan Bollard and Robe11 Buckle Economic liberalisation in New Zealand. ( 1987 Allen Un win ew 
Zealand Ltd, Wellington ) 15 1. 
69 Treasury Economic Ma nagement (Wellington 1984) 285. 
70 A Bollard and M Pickford " tility Regulation in ew Zealand" in M E Bees ley (ed) Regulating Uti!tties: 
Broadening th e Debate (Institute of Economi c Affairs and London Business School , London, 1997), 79. 
71 BatTy Ba11on "More Res tructuring: the Governments New Proposals for Electri city Reform ," ( 1998) 2 
BRMB, 134. 
72 Brian Easton Th e Commercisalisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland 1997) 23 . 
73 Easton , above, I 78. 
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objectives were removed. 74 Shareholding's in SOE's were split between the Minister of 
Finance and the relevant Minister. While these Minister's were still meant to be 
responsible to the house, their role in the day-to-day operation of the business was 
severely diminished. 75 The minister's job was effectively limited to appointing the board, 
approving annual statements and giving directions on dividends. 
B The Initial Effect of the Reforms. 
In the electricity industry the SOE Act lead to all of NZED assets being 
transferred to Electrocorp NZ (ECNZ) in 1987. The government was serious about 
Electrocorp being run as a business. Prominent businessmen and Business Roundtable 
members John Fernyhough and Rod Deane were appointed as board chair and CEO 
respectively.76 These two were not only shrewd businessmen but were also strong 
proponents of privatisation. 77 In 1988 Transpower was set up as a subsidiary of 
Electrocorp to run the transmission services. While this shifted generation into a 
corporate structure, retail remained with the Power Boards at this point. The government 
had not overlooked the Power Boards. A task force was implemented in 1988 to look at 
the Power Board's structure and potential options for reform.78 The task force reported a 
number of concerns about the industry. These were the same concerns that underlined the 
liberalisation process. Retailers were operating under unclear and sometimes 
contradicting goals, without adequate performance monitoring and received special 
operating conditions that protected inefficient behavior.79 The answer that the task force 
recommended was deregulation of the retail market. The government should transform 
the ESA's into retail companies and remove their statutory protection. The fact that this 
would remove a large amount of regulation from the natural monopoly lines business did 
not appear to be a concern. Any abuses in the market could be dealt with through light-
handed regulation and the Commerce Act 1986. The use of light-handed regulation 
74 SOE Act 1986, s 4. 
75 SOE Act 1986, s 6. 
76 Patt1ick Smellie " Hands Off Approach to SOE Policy Has Proved its Worth" (4 February 1994) The 
Independent Auckland, I 0. 
77 "Chasing the Techies I lol y Grail" (5 February 1999) The National Business Review Auckland 
78 Elect1icity Task Force 1988. 
79 Electricity Task Force, above, 7. 
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would become the primary method of government regulation for the industries monopoly 
assets. 80 The reports recommendations took until 1990 to have an effect under the 
Electric Power Boards Amendment Act. This allowed the government to appoint new 
board members to the Power Boards who would later become the directors of the retail 
companies when these companies were formed. 81 The fact that the government could not 
immediately corporatise retail was illustrative some of the huge barriers the liberialisation 
program faced in the electricity industry. Retail was a large industry in New Zealand; by 
this stage there were 53 Electric Supply Authorities with 9000 staff and an annual 
turnover of approximately 1.81 Billion dollars. 82 In order to reform this industry correctly 
there would have to be a series of steps over a sustained period of time to create a free 
market retail sector. 
C The Policy Process. 
While the fourth Labour government had not yet privatised any state assets in 
electricity there had been other national asset sales. The first asset sales were in early 
1987 with the sale of shares in the BNZ and Petrocorp. By 1990 the program had 
successfully sold New Zealand Steel, Petrocorp, Health Computing Service, 
Development Finance Corporation, Postbank, the Shipping Corporation, Air New 
Zealand, Landcorp mortgages, the Rural Bank, the Government Printing Office, the 
National Film Unit, Communicate New Zealand, State Insurance Office, Tourist Hotel 
Corporation, New Zealand Liquid Fuels Investment, Maui Gas Fields, Synfuels plants, 
forestry cutting rights and the Export Guarantee Corporation.83 It was quickly becoming 
apparent that corporatisation often lead to privatisation. This did not seem to be the 
generally accepted policy in the Labour pa11y. The Labour government had been elected 
without a coherent economic policy, vast differences between party members were 
80 Light-handed regulation had three central elements. These are extensive information disclosure in order 
to increase transparency, the use of the provisions of the Commerce Act 1986 to deal with anti-competitive 
behaviour and the threat of further regulation such as price control if market dominance is abused. See 
Ministry of Commerce, Energy and Resource Division , Energy Policy Group, Light handed Regulation of 
New 's Zealand's Electricity and Gas industries (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington , October 1995) 
81 Kelsey, above, 52. 
82 Electricity Supply Association "A nnual Report" 1989, 2. 
83 Jane Kelsey Rolling Back the State (Bridget Williams Books Ltd , GP Ptint, Wellington) 45 . 
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papered over for the election. It 1984 eiection manifesto was not published until after the 
election. 84 It is unlikely that these differences would have been resolved in favour of a 
wide-ranging privatisation program. Economist Brian Ea tern suppo1ts this position: 
" During 1986 at least three senior ministers stated that the intention was to improve the delivery of social 
spending and there was no intention to privatise SOE 's. Politicians rarely lie blatantly (although they are 
well known for being economical with the truth)."85 
This view seems consistent with future events. Original asset sale were justified on the 
grounds of paying back massive public debt. 86 Cleary this was a pressing need for ew 
Zealand and was accepted as an extreme measure to deal with an extreme circumstance. 
However as debt was repaid the asset sale continued. Jane Kelsey argues in her book The 
New Zealand Experiment that the privatisation of national assets was a policy 
implemented by a few key Ministers with the support of Treasury without mandate and in 
a deliberate way as to subvert opposition either internally or externally.87 This statement 
seems have a large element of truth to it. While Labour lacked a coherent economic 
policy, Treasury had clear goals. Its 1984 briefing to the government introduced 
corporatisation, its 1987 briefing was based on the necessity of privatisation of state 
assets.88 Kelsey's argument is that due to New Zealand's lack of constitutional checks 
and balances the Finance team, with the support of Treasury, could capture New 
Zealand's democratic institutions and implement this policy without a majority of support 
in the house. The process developed like this. The Finance team had the complete support 
of Treasury. They could almost always go to Cabinet and find a majority through core 
supporters. Due to the support of Treasury Ministers who disagreed often found 
themselves with no alternative well-formed policy to advocate. Once a majority was 
found in Cabinet then a majority could almost always be found in Caucus through the 
convention of solidarity. Under New Zealand 's First Past the Post electoral system a 
84 Simon Walker Rogernomics, Reshaping New Zealand 's Economy (GP Books, Auckalnd , 1989) 211 . 
85 Bri an Easton The Comm ercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997) 23 . 
86 Bruce Jesson Only Their Purpose is Mad (Dunmoore Press Ltd, Palmerston orth, 1999) 161. 
87 Jane Kelsey Th e New Zealand Experiment (Auckland University Press, Bridget Willaims Books 1995) 
28. 
88 Treasury Government Management: Brief to the Incoming Go vernment 1987 (Wellington 1987) 
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majority in Caucus would lead to a majo1ity in the house. As a single house system with a 
single party ruling government and no entrenched constitution the elected party had 
complete power to pass legislation. Once control of the house had been obtained the next 
step was to implement policy quickly, avoiding public debate as much as possible. The 
use of the urgency prov1s1ons would prove to very effective, both in their ability to 
implement legislation quickly and in avoiding the select committee process. This 
approach to liberalisation has subsequently been coined as the "Blitzkrieg."89 Roger 
Douglas in his 1993 book Towards Prosperity commented on the underlying philosophy 
to this approach: 
lf a solution makes sense in the medium te1m, go for it without qualification or hesitation. othing 
else delivers a result which will truly satisfy the public. 
Consensus among interest groups on quality decisions rarely, if ever, arises before they are made 
and implemented. It develops, after they are taken , as decisions deliver satisfactory results to the 
public. 
Do not try to advance one step at a time. Define your objectives clearly and move towards them in 
quantum leaps. 
Vested interests continuously underestimate their own ability to adjust successfully m an 
environment where the government is rapidly removing privilege across a wide front. 
It is unce1iainty, not speed, that endangers the success of structural reform programs. Speed is an 
essential ingredient in keeping uncertainty down to the lowest possible level. 
Once the program begins to be implemented, don ' t stop until you have completed it. The fire of 
opponents is much less accurate if they have to shoot at a rapidly moving target. 
The abolition of privilege is the essence of structural reform." 
90 
Under this process the liberialisation program was pushed through the house with the 
view that it would be accepted when its results became apparent. This approach assumes 
that those implementing the reforms were correct in direction, approach and 
implementation and this would subsequently prove itself The process had initially 
89 Brian Easton Th e Comm ercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland 1997) 73. 
90 Roger Douglas Towards Prosperity (David Bateman, Auckland , 1993) 215-238 . 
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proved to be very successful, however by 1988 Roger Douglas's view was that left wing 
of the Labour party had began to reassert itself.
91 It was in this year that Douglas 
supporter Richard Prebble was dismissed from cabinet and Douglas himself was forced to 
resign. 92 He was subsequently re-elected to cabinet but not as Minister of Finance. 
Telecom was still privatised in 1990 but could only get through the house with its "Kiwi 
Share" proposal.9
3 This required a certain amount of shares to go to New Zealand citizens 
and required that residential line charges did not increase faster than the rate of inflation. 
This was quite a departure from the usual process that was an unconditional sale by 
tender. The influence of the left became apparent in other areas. When NZ Post was made 
an SOE the Deed of Understanding required that the SOE cross-subsidised the loss 
making rural mail. Clearly central parts of liberalisation program were getting changed to 
placate dissident MP's. Perhaps the biggest sign of the conflicting pressure's in the 
government was when Jim Anderton resigned in protest at the privatisation of the Bank 
of New Zealand and Postbank.
94 The Labour party had effectively split in two with those 
suppo11ing continued liberilaisation on one side and those resisting on the other. 
95 While 
this resistance could not reverse the liberialsation process it did manage to effectively 
stall it. 
By the time the reforms slowed in 1990 they had achieved a large amount of 
structural change in the economy. For the electricity this change had been slower than for 
other industries. Electricity presented some unique problems for the liberalisation 
process. Electricity is characterised by high levels of technical complexity, the need for 
co-ordination of continuous delivery and the need for co-ordination of transmission 
security and investment.96
 If the aim was for privatisation then generation needed to be 
split from transmission, then generation would need to be further split to prevent a natural 
monopoly, competitive lines companies would need to be formed, the Power Boards 
9 1 Brian Easton, above, 187. 
92 Simon Walker Rogernomics, Reshaping New Zealand's Economy (GP Books, Auckalnd, 1989), 209 
93 Kelsey, above, 45 
94 Chris Trotter "David Lange, Thanks for the Rise or was that the Slide?" (3 March 1995) The 
Independent, Auckland 7. 
95 Simon Walker Rogernomics. Reshaping New Zealnd 's Economy (GP Books, Auckalnd, 1989) 219. 
96 Lewis Evans and eil Quigley "Competiti ve and Centrally Planned dec ision Making in the Electric 
Industry." (2003) ew Zealand Institute for the tudy of Competition and Regulation . 
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needed to be changed to competitive businesses and then needed to operate in a 
competitive retail environment. All this had to be achieved without disrupting the supply 
of electricity to New Zealand. Labour had taken the first steps in this process. generation 
and transmission were in business structures and Power Boards had taken the first step 
towards retail competition. Governmental control over the industry was greatly 
diminished; almost all Ministerial oversight and influence had disappeared. By 1990 the 
Ministry of Electricity had been disbanded, the very limited role that remained was 
shifted to the Ministry of Commerce.97 The directors of SOE's made decisions on all 
aspects of the business including infrastructure investment. The Minister's role had 
changed from directing on New Zealand's energy requirements and employment needs to 
appointing directors. The problem for the liberialisation program was that the time it was 
taking to reform the electric industry meant that it faced the mounting resistance against 
the liberalisation program. 
Labours inability to continue reforms was not matched by a reversal of high-level 
support for the liberialsation program. The government established a review of the 
structure and regulatory environment for the bulk electricity supply industry in 1988. The 
task force, including representatives from Treasury, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry 
of Commerce and ECNZ, suggested large-scale deregulation and privatisation of the 
industry.98 Transpower should be a separate entity subject to light-handed regulation.
99 
Generation should not be subject to large scale break-up but should be split into two 
companies and subsequently privatised. 100 The Power Boards should be formed into 
companies and have their statutory monopolies removed. 101 As Labours program stalled 
they were replaced by National who would continue the process Labour had begun. 
97 See http://www.med.govt.nz/ers/electric/chronology/chronology.html#P44 4623 last accessed 25 
September 2003 . 
98 Electricity Task Force. Structure Regulation and Ownership of the Electricity fndust, y . Report of the 
Electricity Task Force (Wellington 1989) 9. 
99 Elect1icity Task Force, above, 15. 
100 Electricity Task Force, above, 20. 
101 Electricity Task Force, above, 7. 
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D National 's Liberalisation Program. 
The liberalisation program was expected to be easier for ational. Philosophically 
National was a party based on the economic freedom of the individual. Despite this the 
program hit some major barriers. National faced both internal and external pressure 
against the reforms. For electricity one of the major barriers were problems that began to 
arise in newly deregulated markets. Roger Douglas's view that consensus would emerge 
from interest groups "as satisfactory results emerge" was undermined by regular 
shortages and scandals in the industry. Despite this continued resistance National made 
large-scale structural change during the period up to 1999. For electricity often this was a 
process of finishing off the reforms that Labour had started. 
National 's main internal pressure came in the form of cabinet minister Winston 
Peters. Peters had campaigned on the policy of government re-intervention in the 
economy and ending asset sales. After the election he continued to be outspoken from 
cabinet. He was not alone in his criticism and often core policies were deviated to placate 
MP's wishes. 102 Whilst these factors made the process difficult the National cabinet was 
still controlled by free market fundamentalists. The internal pressure caused the 
liberalisation reforms to be slightly altered in the way they were implemented but there 
was no change in fundamental direction. National's resistance was not only internal; the 
reforms had begun to attract significant public resistance. The liberalisation process had 
turned to the labour markets and social welfare.103
 These area's tended to unite 
opposition, market liberalisation looked to be taking advantage members of society who 
could not protect themselves. Privatisation of national assets remained unpopular. Whilst 
Labours assets sales had been extensive they had avoided core assets. ational, if it 
wished to continue, had to sell the difficult sells. These sales included the remaining 
public utilities, electricity and the postal service. The potential sale of these assets would 
102 Jane Kelsey Th e New Zealand Experiment (Auckland University Press, Bridget Willaims Books 1995) 
41. 
103 Losing Sight of the Lodestar of Economic Freedom. Wolfgang Casper. ew Zealand Business Round 
Table December 2002, 13 . 
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bring the liberalisation program closer to home than any other asset sale. When the 
Minister of SOE's suggested selling ew Zealand Post a subsequent Heylan Poll showed 
voters generally agree that the business sector uses assets more efficiently but that New 
Zealand Post was unique and should remain state run.
104 This type of public opinion left 
National with few options to convince the public that privatisation with electricity should 
progress, the justification based on the benefits of the market were not being accepted 
and it could no longer be claimed that asset sales were to pay back public debt. 
The electricity industry itself added to the privatisation backlash. Electrocorp had 
been a model of an SOE in its pursuit of commercial goals. In 1987 when Electrocorp 
became an SOE it had employed 5999 workers and made a 141.2 Million dollar profit. 
By the 1991-92 year it had increased its profit to over 400 million dollars and decreased 
its staff to 3690. Electrocorp had boosted this profit figure by $50 million dollars by 
investing in loss making companies to offset their tax liability. This profit put the return 
on investor's funds at just over 12%.
105 Despite this Electrocorp announced plans to 
increase bulk electricity prices by 20% over the next twenty years. Unsurprisingly this 
lead to a sustained outcry and a bi-partisan select committee. The committee reported 
back in 1992 with the finding that 50% of this increase would go to Electrocorp as profit 
and that the increase was just not justified.
106 The government broke the corporatisation 
rules and applied leverage on Electrocorps board, securing a more moderate increase. 
This process seemed to confirm the fears of both sides of the liberlisation program. Those 
who criticised the reforms could point to ECNZ as an example of the free market leading 
to generation companies abusing their position to gain super normal profits. Those 
advocating privatisation had confirmation that the SOE structure did not prevent 
government interference on political grounds. Two of the biggest proponents of 
privatisation were the ECNZ CEO Rod Deane and Board Chair John Femyhough. Deane 
104 NZ Herald , 25 April 1992. 
105 Kelsey above 124. 
106 Commerce and Marketing Select Committee Report on the !11q11i1y into the Proposed Increase of 
Wholesale and Retail Electricity Prices. (Feb 1992). 
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resigned citing government interference and Femyhough did not seek reappointment for 
the same reason. 107 
Hostility towards Electrocorp was further compounded by an electricity shortage 
in 1992. The shortage required a 10% reduction in consumption by consumers at the start 
of winter.
108 ECNZ blamed a one hundred year drought, others blamed short-term profit 
maximising, a lack of prudent planning, the promotion of excessive consumption and the 
promotion of cheaper hydropower over more reliable geothermal resources. There were 
unsubstantiated claims of senior management bonuses being tied to profit or increase in 
electricity use. It was suggested that these factors lead to less storage of energy earlier in 
the year that contributed to the crisis.
109 The shortage was used as ammunition in the anti-
privatisation debate. If the discipline of the market was meant to be good for consumers 
why was there a power shortage? Especially one that may have been a result of the 
market system rather than a victim of natural causes. The subsequent review laid only a 
small amount of blame at the director's feet. Its view was that this shortage was not 
caused by bad management practice, but by a very dry year. ECNZ could have 
implemented thermal energy at an earlier date but apart from that they operated as they 
should have. 110 The report's solution for the future years would lie in the market. By 
implementing a wholesale market for the supply of bulk electricity appropriate price 
signals would either encourage or limit consumption and avoid future power sho11ages.
111 
This early period of Nationals term included the conclusion of the Resource 
Management Law Reform. 11 2 This was a process of rationalising New Zealand's 
environmental Jaw resulting in the Resource Management Act 1991. This project had 
107 Jane Kelsey Rolling Back th e State, Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/ New Zealand. (Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 35. 
108 Dennis Welch "Power Without Responsibility" (April 19-25 2003) The listener I 6. 
109 Jane Kelsey Rolling Back the State. Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/ New Zealand. (Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington , 1993) 37 
11 0 The Electricity Shortage 1992: The Repor1 of the Electricity Shortage Review Committee. (December 
1992 Wellington). 
111 Electricity Shortage Review Committee, above, 79. 
112 Geoffrey Palmer. E11viro11m ental Politics, A Creenprint for New Zealand (John Mc lndoe Ltd , Dunedin, 
1990), 91. 
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been implemented under Labour and was completed under a National government 
enjoying broad cross party supp011. The RMA seems to be an anomaly for its time for 
two reasons. Firstly its process was marked by broad consultation; over 3,500 
submissions were received on the Bill as it went through the house. 11 3 Most of this 
interest came from environmental groups, with Treasury only beginning to criticise the 
Bill towards the end of its process.
114 Secondly, when the Act was eventually passed 
Treasury had only managed to get limited concessions to free market ideals that 
dominated the period. 115 Quite how the Act avoided this is unclear, Geoffrey Palmer's 
view was that environmental law reform "lacks political sex appeal." 116 It may have been 
that the Bill just wasn't noticed by many politicians and that Treasury didn't see it as a 
priority. The Act would go on to have a major effect on any major development involving 
natural resources in New Zealand. For electricity in particular the Act's potential to draw 
out resource consent being granted would provide a barrier to investment in new 
generation capacity. 
E National's Reform of Electricity. 
National 's reform of electricity continued to build on the groundwork Labour had 
begun. National' s primary goal was to finish the shift to corporate structures and to create 
competitive environment for each sector of the industry. The first sector to be reformed 
was retail. The Power Boards were corporatised in 1992 by the Energy Companies Act 
1992. The boards registered as ordinary limited liability companies under the Companies 
Act. The board members introduced in 1990 were now managing directors of the new 
companies. The board's structures were now consistent with opening the market to 
11 3 Francis Castles, Ro! f Gerritsen and Jack Vowels. The Great Experiment: Labour Parties and Public 
Policy Transformation in Australia and New Zealand. KH L P1inting, Singapore, 1996) 121 . 
114 P Ali Memon Keeping New Zealand Green, Recent Environmental Reforms. ( niversity ofOtago Press , 
1993) 92. 
11 5 Mainly this was through transferable water abstraction permits, user charges for permit applications, 
perfom1ance bonds and environmental compensation. 
11 6 Palmer, above, 91. 
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competition which was introduced forrnally in 1993. 117 With this Act the elected Power 
Boards that had existed for over 70 year were gone. The Act implemented the light-
handed regulation regime requiring the compulsory public disclosure of certain annual 
financial and performance information of the power companies. 11 8 Any business that 
owned both lines companies and retail companies had to account for these items 
separately.
119 This reform changed the public perception of Electricity. It was no longer a 
public utility but a commodity to be brought and sold on the market. The aim of this was 
that the new market would bring an increase in efficiency that would benefit consumers. 
Retailers would aim to enter new area's. Smaller boards would be forced to amalgamate 
with bigger competitors to remain competitive. Competition between these big retailers 
would force prices down. The success of the reforms in creating these cut-throat business 
entities was marginal. Ownership of the retail businesses did not quickly transfer to 
private companies, often remaining in Community Trusts and local body operators. 120 
Often these trusts continued behaving in the similar manner as the Power Boards. 
In 1994 Transpower was separated off from ECNZ and became its own SOE. This 
separated out transmission services from generation services. ECNZ was now in a 
position to be split into smaller companies and possibly sold. One generator owning the 
only national grid would have created an effective monopoly situation. Now that 
transmission was in its own company it could conceivably offer its services generators. It 
had taken 7 years but the National government had completed an important step in the 
reform of the electricity industry. Retail, generation and transmission were all in separate 
business structures. 
The government had the structures in place but there was a lack of competition, 
the lines businesses in particular were beginning to look as through they may be taking 
advantage of their natural monopoly position. The government expressed this concern 
11 7 Electiicity Act 1992, 71. 
11 8 Electticity Act 1992, s 170. 
119 Electricity Act 1992, s 170 
120See http ://www.med.govt.nzlers/electric/chronology/chronology.html# P75_8843 last accessed 25 
September 2003 . 
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with the threat of separation of lines and rdail business's in its 1995 Policy Statement on 
Electricity. 
"lf there is a clear and consistent pattern of abuse of natural monopoly line businesses, the Government 
would seriously consider requiring the ownership of lines businesses to be separated from the ownership of 
competitive activities, such as generation and energy retailing." 12 1 
In order to create competition m the generation market the government created the 
wholesale market (WSM) for bulk electricity. The government had been working towards 
this since the report on the 1992 shortage. The process had not run smoothly and original 
reports had been revised. 122 By 1995 the government had a set of final recommendations 
to work from. The basis of the market was that purchasers could find the real price of 
electricity and make usage decisions on that. A simpler version had been in place for the 
1992 shortages, but had a price cap that limited its effectiveness. 
123 The WSM is a 
voluntary system designed to work on straight supply and demand. It allows generators to 
compete directly against each other on the open market. The market was also aimed at 
avoiding future supply shortages. As lake levels drop the supply of electricity drops and 
the price of electricity increases. As the price increases large users will cut back on 
electricity lowering demand. The system is complemented with long-term sellable hedge 
contracts that can protect consumers from high spot prices and create an incentive to 
conserve power when spot prices are high. If users conserve power when there is a 
shortage they can sell the hedge contracts on the open market and make a profit. Ron 
McNamara, head of research and development at Electricity Marketing Company (The 
company in charge of the wholesale market) stated that the wholesale market would 
completely end the type of shortage that occurred in 1992.
124 The government moved to 
implement the market by splitting ECNZ into Contact Energy and ECNZ.
125 Contact 
Energy started operations in 1996 with 22% of the market. Six months later the proposed 
12 1 Government Policy Statement Wholesale Electricity Reform , Regulation of the Electricity Lines 
Businesses (Wellington, June, 1995) 
122 E.G. Baird, F.T and Culy, J. "Towards a Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market Wholesale 
Electricity Market Study Report" WEMS/5 October 1992 
123 Electricity Shortage Review Committee, above, 77 . 
124 Dennis Welch "Power Without Responsibility" (April 19-25 2003) The Listener l 9. 
125See http ://www.maxbradford.co.nz/national_ news/electricity/2001-1 1-0 l -Ele-Chrono _ 1986-200 I .pdf 
I 0. Last Accessed 28 May 2003. 
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wholesale market started operations. TLe split of ECNZ had other advantages for the 
government. There were now two major providers of generation capacity; the 
government could now sell one without risking a commercial operator taking advantage 
of a monopoly over electricity generation. 
F The Influence of MMP. 
The liberalisation process had continued despite wide spread public opposition of 
the process. The process had split both parties; Jim Anderton left Labour to create New 
Labour and then to lead the Alliance, Peter Dunne had also left Labour to start the United 
Party (Later to become United Future) and Winston Peters left National and started New 
Zealand First. Parties had sustained both public image damage as well as internal 
division. The new parties appearing showed politicians unable to find parties with 
policies they agreed with. The New Zealand voting public was finding the same problem. 
Reforming governments under both Labour and National had pursued an ideological goal 
while almost completely ignoring the views of the electorate. David Lange commented 
on the fourth Labour government after leaving politics: 
"The risk of being a reforming government, a radical government, is that you develop a taste for, in fact an 
enormous appetite for the adrenaline of change and you take it beyond what is acceptable and rational. We 
got thrown out of office because we went beyond that which was essential and we started to pursue things 
for there own sake and the sake of ideology." 126 
Unfortunately for the voting public when Labour was "thrown out" of office because of 
its ideology-based policies they were replaced by a National party who continued the 
same policies. The reforming governments were extremely unpopular. Election results 
over this period tend to show massive shifts away from the government that was in 
power. 127 By 1993 voters were rejecting the major parties, both polled under 36% in that 
126 listener 19 A11g11st 1989 
127 In 1984 Labour came to power with a 17 seat majority, the 1987 election saw them re-elected with a 
similar majority. As the liberialisation program started to have effect ational was re-elected with a 37 seat 
majority which was reduced to I scat in 1993. Elections New Zealand Seats Held by Parties After General 
Elections, 1890- 1993. See http ://elections.catalyst.net.nz/elections/pandr/vote/seats- I 993.html last accessed 
25 September 2003 . 
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election. This was almost the lowest either party had polled in their history. 128 Despite 
these low results parties outside Labour and National held only two seats in the house. 
The ability of pa11ies to form government with such small support from the electorate had 
been a criticism levelled at New Zealand ' s political system for some time. 129 Support had 
grown to such an extent that the 1993 election included a referendum on New Zealand 's 
system for electing its government. The referendum was narrowly in favour of replacing 
the FPP system with a Mixed Member Proportionate (MMP) system. 130 The MMP 
system was aimed at ending results like those in the 1993 election where National could 
form government with only 35.1 % of the vote. The expected result of the system was that 
government would have to be formed over multiple parties. This multi party approach 
should have reduced the effectiveness of the "Blitzkrieg" reform. The parliamentary whip 
system in particular would be less effective across party lines. MMP did seem to have an 
influence on stopping abuses of the democratic process, however arguably the electric 
industry was still to provide the last example of the "Blitzkrieg". 
The first MMP election was held in 1996. On election night Winston Peters and 
New Zealand First found themselves in the position to return either National or Labour to 
government. Peters went into negotiations with both parties, despite campaigning on a 
"No National" platform. A coalition government was formed between New Zealand First 
and National. 131 Peter ' s other main platform was a promise to stop asset sales. The 
resulting Coalition Agreement named certain state owned assets that could not be sold. 
This included both ECNZ and Contact Energy. Under this a1Tangement the coalition 
government continued the reforn1 of electricity. 
128 Elections New Zea land Seats Held by Parties Aft er General Elections, 1890- 1993. See 
http ://elections .catalyst.n et.n zJe lections/pand r/vote/seats- 1993. html las t accessed 25 September 2003. 
129 The lead up to thi s re ferendum had begun in the I 950' s. By 1985 there had been a Roya l Commi ssion 
into the el ectoral sys tem. While th e " Blitzkri eg" reforms may have influenced voters it was not the tri gge r 
for th e movement to change the system. See Paul I lani s, Chi e f Executi ve Electoral Commission o f ew 
Zealand New Zealand 's Change to MMP See http ://www.aceproj ect.org/main/eng li sh/ ei/eiy nzO I .htm for 
more information on the bac kground to th e change in e lectora l sys tem. Last accessed 25 September 2003 
130Harri s, above, see http ://www.aceproj ect.org/main/eng li sh/ ei/eiy_ nzO I .htm las t accessed 25 September 
2003. 
13 1 "NZ First Picks National" (11 December 1996) Th e Dominion, Wellington. 
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G A Better Deal for Consumers. 
In 1998 the Coalition released the electricity package "A Better Deal for 
Consumers". The package was designed to ensure consumers were sent the proper signals 
from the market and that there was constant downward pressure on electricity prices. 132 
The package reflected the politics of the time. New Zealand First stopped assets sales but 
did not object to the general direction of the reforms. So while the package did not 
propose the sale of state owned generators 133 it did split ECNZ into three separate 
companies in order to increase competition. 134 The package split the industry into two 
categories. Natural monopolies such as the lines companies and transmission were 
subject to increased light-handed regulation and the threat of price control. Competitive 
industries like generation and retail would face reforms to increase the level of 
competition. 
Lines companies faced stronger light-handed regulation with more stringent 
requirements under the Electricity (Information Disclosure) Requirements Act 1994. 
These measures were aimed at providing better-cost allocation for the distribution 
companies financial reporting. 135 The reforms introduced the threat of price control for 
distribution. 136 It was felt that lines companies were taking advantage of their natural 
monopoly position. The threat of regulation under the Commerce Act seemed a drastic 
one to take, however its potential was always considered a part of the light-handed 
132 Ministry of Economic Deve lopment "A Better Deal/or Consumers" (Welling ton , 1998) See 
http://www.med.govt.nz/ers/elect1i c/b lueprin t/index .html Las t Accessed 27 A pril 2003. 
133 Mini stry of Economic Deve lopment "A Better Deal/or Consumers" (Wellington, 1998) 
http ://www.med.govt.n z/ers/e lectric/bluep1in t/blueprintO I .html #P2 I 7 _8590 
134 Ministry of Economi c Deve lopment "A Better Deal/or Co11s 11mers" (Wellington , 1998) 
http ://www.med .govt.nz/ers/e lectri c/b lueptin t/bl ueprint02. htm l# P302 _ I 2262 
135 Ministry of Economi c Deve lopment "A Better Deal fo r Co11s11mers" (We lling ton , 1998) 
http ://www. med .govt.nz/ers/e lectri c/bl uepri n t/b l uepri nt03. htm l#P63 5 _ 3 3457 
136Ministry of Economi c Development "A Better Deal fo r Consumers" (Wei ling ton , 1998) 
http ://www. med .govt.n z/ers/e lectri c/b l uepri nt/bl uepri n t03. htm l# P946 _ 52384 
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regime in relation to the electric industry 137 At this point the only regulations affecting 
the industry were the Fair Trading Act 1986, the Commerce Act 1986, and the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 138 
The retail market came under scrutiny; the general view was that privatisation had 
not brought the benefits it should have. The Electricity Industry Reform Act banned any 
company from owning a lines operation as well as either an electricity retailing or 
generation operation.
139 It was still acceptable for a generator to own a retailer and vice 
versa. The decision was focused on increasing competition between retailers by giving all 
retailers access to distribution lines and making retailers more responsive to customer 
demands. 140 The split would also deal with the growing concern that company mergers 
could lead to large vertically integrated monopolies over de facto franchise area's. At 
present a company could gain control of retail, distribution and supply for the area and 
have little, if any, market pressure on them. 141 The split of companies was a drastic 
measure to take. Economist Ross Paterson commented at the time that it " ... was 
necessary only because light handed regulation had failed." 142 It was a measure that 
would be considered expropriation under either the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investrnent 143 or NAFT A 144 and would be cause for compensation. Transalta for one 
complained very loudly and threatened capital flight if the legislation was enacted. 145 The 
separation of these business structures is a prime example of the government's 
unwavering belief in the market. Rather than introduce regulation to control how the 
market operates the government would take this drastic and unpopular action to create a 
137 Ministry of Commerce, Energy and Resource Division, Energy Policy Group, Light handed Regulation 
of New 's Zealand 's Electricity and Gas Industries (Ministry of Commerce, Wei lington, October 1995), I. 
138 See http://www.nzelectricity.co.nzlCl Overview.htm Last Accessed 28 April 2003 
139 Electiicity Industry Reform Act 1998, Parts 1-5 . 
140 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Dea/for Consumers" (Wellington , 1998) 
http ://www. med .govt.nzlers/electri c/bl uepri nt/bl uepti n t03. htin l#P7 5 8 _ 40850 
141 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Consum ers" (Wellington, 1998) 
http://www.med.govt.nzlers/electric/bluepri nt/blueprint03 . html# P760 _ 40916 
142 Ross Paterson "Light handed Regulation in ew Zealand Ten Years On" ( 1998) Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 6(2), 155. 
143 Multilateral Agreement on Investment, section iv . 
144 North American Free Trade Agreement, Article I I I 0 
145 Press, 2/6/98, "TransAlta threatens to pull out of ew Zealand", p. 18. 
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free market subject to competitive forces. Paterson's assertion that this showed the failure 
of light handed regulation is conect, but perhaps should be qualified. The split was 
necessary because light-handed regulation failed to work on these structures. The 
government set about changing the industry structure to one that would work without 
heavey-handed regulation. Once structural change was achieved the government would 
again regulate primarily through light-handed regulation. When the legislation passed it 
was accepted by the industry, most businesses staying with their monopoly lines 
businesses. The four exceptions, (Tansalta, Contact Energy, ECNZ and Trustpower) were 
to become the main retailers in the country, scrambling to amass as many customers as 
possible. 146 The retail reforms were completed by an expectation that the industry would 
set up a system for swapping retailers. The industry itself had made this very difficult. 
The reforms made it clear that the government expected them to provide a system for 
swapping retailer's or face regulation. 147 
The government had aimed this package at consumers who were still unhappy 
with the industry, however the underlying approach had not changed. The package aimed 
at increasing competition between the industries companies. The benefit to consumers 
would come as a result of this increased competition. The process for passing legislation 
seemed quite similar to pre-MMP government. The Act was passed on the 3rd of July 
1998 with a very tight time frame, the select committee process was held over three days. 
The select committee terms of reference did not allow it to consider submissions on the 
substantive policy of the Act. 148 A total of 224 submissions were received a majority of 
which were not in favour of the Act. Despite this the Act went ahead. 
The aim that this package would dampen public criticism was largely undermined 
later that year. On the 20 February 1998 Auckland's main power cables failed cutting 
146 While these four would dominant there was in fact 7 retailers down from 39 at the start of the year 
147 Ministry of Economic Development "A Belter Deal/or Consumers" (Wellington, 1998) 
http: //www. med .govt .nz/ers/electri c/bl uepri n t/b I uepri n t03. htm I# P924 _ 5062 0 
148 Submissions could only concern technical and implementation measures. 
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power to its CBD. 149 The official investigation blamed the unusually hot weather. 150 
However documents released after the crisis showed that Mercury had known that the 
cables were reaching the end of their life and carrying capacity. 151 Generally consumers 
raised questions about the management of Mercury and whether they were putting profit 
before power security. 152 The fact that it was Mercury Energy at the center of the scandal 
was embarrassing for the government. The central government had wished to privatise 
Mercury in order to claim full benefits of a competitive market. Local authorities had 
resisted. Eventually the central government had forced Mercury into an arrangement 
where they were owned by a community trust, but controlled by one of New Zealand's 
largest law firm's. 153 Under this arrangement Mercury embarked on an aggressive 
strategy to take over neighboring companies. This had lead to a hostile and public 4-year 
battle with Utilicorp over the other Auckland power Company, the New Zealand Power 
Company in the years leading up to the shortage. 154 The incident raised questions, had 
Mercury spent money on takeover bids instead of ensuring that infrastructure was 
correctly maintained? Was the failure of the cables a result of the reform 's and free 
market behavior? This last question becomes even more apparent when Auckland's 
experience is compared to Christchurch's Southpower. Christchurch City Council owns 
Southpower and the company has been running well and returning healthy profits back to 
the council. It appears that Council ownership did not lead to an inefficient retailer. As 
with the experiences with ECNZ in 1992 the proposition that a market based electricity 
system would provide the best result to New Zealanders was again undermined. 
149 Ministerial Inquiry Auckland Power Supply Failure 1998: The Report of the Ministerial /nqui,y into the 
Auckland Power Supply Failure ( 1998) 21. 
150 Ministe1ial Inquiry Auckland Power Supply Failure /998: The Report of the Ministerial Inquiry into the 
Auckland Power Supply Failure ( 1998) 116. 
151 "Mercury had warning signals- Document" (3 March 1998) Waikato Times Waikato 
152 " Failures Related. Leader to the Editor" (11 March 1998) The Dominion, Wellington 
153 The Auckland Consumer Energy Trust was to originally hold I 00% of the capita l in Mercury, however 
under the establishment plan 25% was held by law finn Russel McVeagh with the intention that this would 
be made available in a public offering. Under the establi shment plan this 25% gave Russel McVeagh a 
49.5% of the voting rights and the ability to appoint 6 of the 11 director . The Trust submitted to the 
inquiry that despite their 75% shareholding that they had no role in the policy fonnulat1on of Mercury 
Energy. See Auckland Energy Consumer Trust Submission to Ministerial Inquiry into the Auckland Power 
Supply Failure ( 1998). 
154 "Power play companies compared to alligators" ( 12 September 1997) Christchurch Press, 25. 
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H The Last Move of the Blitzkrieg 
In 1999 the coalition broke down over the proposed sale of Auckland Airport. 155 
National remained in power as a minority government propped up by Act, United Futures 
Peter Dunne, Alliance defector Alimein Kupo and eight former New Zealand First MP's . 
The breakdown freed National from its coalition undertaking not to sell national assets . 
The SOE (Contact Energy) Amendment Bill was passed under urgency avoiding the need 
for select committee. The Act gave the government 2 years to sell Contact energy. 156 
Contact energy was sold in 1999 through a combination of public share issue and a 40% 
sale to US based Edison Mission Energy. 157 The sale was controversial , the eight former 
NZ first MP's and Alimein Kupo had all come from parties against asset sales. Many of 
these MP's only obtained a seat in parliament through the list vote of these parties. On 
this basis the government did not appear to have the mandate sell Contact energy. 
Arguably this was the last move of the "Blitzkrieg". The sale did not have public support; 
it was passed rapidly without a select committee just before an election National was 
likely to lose. 
Latter that year National was voted out of office. This was to mark a turning point 
in the philosophy of the government since the reforms started in 1984. The industry was 
largely unrecognisable from when the reforms started. Generation was fragmented and 
partially private, transmission was now a separate government owned entity, distribution 
lines were private companies and retail was now a series of commercial venture. 
Government overview was minimal; New Zealand was now one of the few countries in 
the OECD with a Minister of Energy with no Ministry to support him. 158 Despite these 
changes the reforn1s had not completed its process in a neo-classical sense. There was a 
large amount of government ownership, the generation was split up but not enough to 
create a competitive environment, transmission was a government owned monopoly and 
there were still serious questions over how competitive the retail and distribution markets 
155 "Chronology of a Coalition Break-up" ( 19 August 1998) The Independent. 
156 "Govt Ridiculed for Fast Track Bill. " (2nd December 1998) Evening Post, Wellington 14. 
157See http ://www .med.govt.n zlers/electric/chronology/chronology-Ol .html#TopOfPage last accessed 27 
April 2003 
158 Dennis Welch "Power Without Responsibility" (Ap1il 19-25 2003) The listener, 19 
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were. Electricity had proven to be one of the most difficult state departments to reform. 
Practically it took a long time to convert this government department into a competitive 
industry. Politically general resistance to the reforms had time to organise against the 
process and slow the speed of the reforms. The introduction of MMP proved to be a large 
barrier. The reforn1ing National government found that it no longer had the political 
ability to continue with fundamental elements of the reform process. 15 years of reform 
had only been able to move the industry to a point where the next step in neo-classical 
reform would be the large-scale privatisation of government assets in generation. For the 
reformist ' s the election of the Labour lead coalition stopped thi s process and for the first 
time in 15 years began a process of partial re-intervention into the electricity industry. 
IV STATE INTERVENTION AS A POLICY OPTION. 
Labour was re-elected in 1999 as the leader of the coalition with the Alliance 
party. Public concern with the electricity industry had not abated by this time. The 
Auckland power crisis was still fresh in the publics mind and consumers were still being 
frustrated when they tried to change retailers. Commenting in 2000 Consumer Institute 
chief executive David Russell, noted that complaints about electricity retailers had 
surpassed c1iticism of banks, this was considered quite a feat at the time. 159 The 
government itself was obviously unhappy with the structure and performance of the 
industry and had begun to look at re-ordering the cunent anangements. 160 Labours view 
was that the changes in the electticity industry had not brought consumers the benefits 
that they should have and initiated a Ministerial Inquiry to find out why. 161 The inquiry 
had extremely wide terms of reference and its final report made 53 recommendations on 
all aspects of the industry. Overall the inquiry acknowledged that the market system was 
the best approach to the industry but recommended government regulation in some 
159 "Judgement Day for Electricity Market Regime" (28 August 2000) NZ !nfotech Weekly, Wellington 
160 Mini ster of Energy, Pete r I lodgson "A fa ir Dea l for energy Consumers" (3 October 2000) 
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circumstances. The reports recommendations were all implemented either directly or in 
modified form with the 2000 Power Package. 162 
A The 2000 Power Package. 
The package released a new Government Policy Statement for electricity. The 
governments overall objective for the industry was that electricity was delivered in an 
efficient, fair, reliable and environmental sustainable manner. The main point of the 
policy statement was its expectation for future industry action on governance 
arrangements. An Electricity Commission (Commission) would be developed to replace 
the three existing governance institutions: New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM), 
Metering and Reconciliation Information Agreement (MARIA) and Multilateral 
Agreement on Common Quality Standards (MACQS). 163 The role of the Commission 
would be to consolidate these agreements and develop more rules in line with a set of 
guiding principles set out in the policy statement. 164 Consistent with the overall objective 
outlined above, the Government was seeking the following specific outcomes: 
a. energy and other resources are used efficiently, and in particular, hydro spill is 
minimised; 
b. risks relating to security of supply, in particular the risks of dry years and 
inadequate transmission and distribution security, are properly and efficiently 
managed; 
c. the full costs of producing and transporting each additional unit of electricity are 
signalled so that investors and consumers can make decisions consistent with 
obtaining the most value from electricity; 
d. delivered electricity costs and prices are subject to sustained downward pressure; 
162 Minister of Energy Peter Hodgson "A fair Deal for energy Consumers" (3 October 2000) 
163 Ministry of Economic Deve lopment Government Policy Statement: Further Development of New 
Zealand's Electricity Industry. (Wellington, 2000) 3. 
164 Ministry of Economic Development Government Policy Statement: Further Development of New 
Zealand 's Electricity lndust,y. (Wellington, 2000) 2. 
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e. the quality of electricity services, and in particular trade-offs between quality and 
price, should as far as possible reflect customers' preferences; 
f. transmission losses and constraints are signaled to ensure that overall costs to the 
economy, including the costs of insufficient competition in local regions, are 
minimised; and 
g. greenhouse gas emissions are minimised. 165 
The Commission would ideally be an industry based self-governing unit. If the industry 
did not act the government threatened to set up its own body. 166 This was a real threat 
with the Electric Industry Act 2001 providing the government with unprecedented 
powers to set up a Crown Entity to fulfil the role. 167 The government initiated the 
Electricity Governance Establishment Committee (EGEC) to facilitate the Commission's 
development. 168 
The power package turned to monopoly lines compames. The inquiry had 
recommended that the government permit the Commerce Commission to have powers to 
set prices for the lines industry. 169 While this measure had been threatened under the 
National it was implemented by the Labour lead coalition under the Electricity Industry 
Act 2001. 170 Under subpart 1 of part 4(a) of the Act the Commerce Commission is 
required to set thresholds for the declaration of control in relation to the lines companies, 
assess businesses against set thresholds, determine whether these thresholds have been 
breached and then make a determination of whether or not to make a declaration of 
165 Ministry of Economic Development Government Policy Statement: Further Developm ent of New 
Zealand's Electricity Industry. (Wellington, 2000) 2. 
166 For future reference the governments powers : create a complaints resolution system for consumers; 
prepayment meters; transition arrangements for insolvent electricity retailers; the connection of generation 
to distribution lines; hydro spill; hedge prices; dispute resolution procedures for disputes between industry 
participants; and the enforcement of electricity governance regulations, whether or not the EGB is 
established, but ifit is established these regulations and rules can only be made after having had regard for 
any EGB recommendation. 
167 Garry Downs " Further Wake-up Call for the Electricity Industry" (Bell Gully Publications, 2001) see 
http://www.bellgully.com/publications/elec_200 I O I wakeup.html last accessed 27 September 2003 
168See http ://www.med.govt.nzlers/electric/chronology/chronology-O I .html#P2 I 5 _27687 last accessed 27 
September 2003 
169 See http://www.med.govt.nz/ers/electric/chronology/chronology-0 I .html#TopOfPage Last Accessed 27 
April 2003 
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control in relation to the business. The thresholds were ultimately based on both price and 
quality standards. 171 Any breach could lead to price control by the Commerce 
Commission. 
As with the prev10us reforms this package was aimed at consumers. Labours 
approach was quite different to previous govememts. Previous reforms had continued to 
de-regulate, with the philosophy that increased competition would benefit consumers. 
Labour's approach was to regulate to give consumers a better deal. Apart from those 
measures outlined above the inquiry recommended a number of other measures. These 
included requiring retailers to offer domestic consumers one low rate fixed charge rate, 
amending the Consumer Guarantees Act to cover electricity, 172 requiring retailers to have 
prepaid meters available to consumers and implementing a consumer complaints system 
similar to the insurance ombudsman. 173 
Overall the reforms had shown elements that would be influential in future 
reforms. Firstly, that the government was unhappy with the state of the electricity 
industry. The media statement released with the document included this statement. 
"The Power Package puts the heat on the electJicity industry, this package will sort out the mess left by the 
previous Government and give consumers the deal they deserve" 174 
This is very strong language aimed at both the National party and the industry. Secondly 
the government would intervene where it perceived the industry cannot produce desirable 
results. 
Following this package there was another shortage in 2001. The predication that 
the WSM would stop supply shortages proved to be incorrect. Confusingly the 
171 See Commerce Commission Regulation of Electricity lines Businesses. Target Control Regime, Draft 
Assessment and Inquiry Guidelines (Process and Analytical Framework) (Wellington, 2003) 4. 
172 See Electricity Supply Association of New Zealand v Commerce Commission and ronsumers Institute 
( 1998) 6 NZBLC I 02. In this case the High Court decided that electricity was not covered under the 
Consumer Guarantee Act 1993 . 
173 Minister of Energy, Peter Hodgson "A fair Deal for energy Consumers" (3 October 2000) Press Release 
174 Minister of Energy, Peter Hodgson "A fair Deal for energy Consumers" (3 October 2000) Press Release 
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subsequent Post Winter Review found tnat the wholesale market had worked a it was 
supposed to, however the shortage could have been ave11ed by if the industry had 
implemented the governments Policy Statement of 2000. 175 Specifically the lack of 
progress towards industry governance was said to be a concern. The government 
appeared to be becoming exasperated with the industry, Energy Minister Peter Hodgson 
was quoted during the sh011age: 
"The two questions in front of me are: how are we going to get through this winter, and next? Second 
question: and why am l asking the first question all the bloody time?" 176 
The following year the government re-issued its policy statement. This statement was 
largely unchanged from the 2000 statement. 177 The government was soon to put into 
action its view that government regulation would be required where the industry failed to 
act. 
B Tile Electricity Commission 
In 2003 the EGEC reported back that the industry had rejected a self governing 
Commission. The industry solution had failed. Self-governance was not wanted by most 
of the big players in the industry. 178 The timing of this rejection proved to be impo11ant, 
coming in the middle of another power shortage. The decision by the government to use 
its powers under the Electricity Amendment Act to implement an Electricity Commission 
was made public on the 20 May 2003. 179 The government released a discussion document 
on the structure of the proposed Commission. It quickly became apparent that the 
government Commission was quite different to the one that had been rejected by the 
industry. The government had decided that industry solution had not only failed to 
175 Minister of Energy Post Winter Electricity Re, ·iell' (Wellington, 2001) 2. 
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develop a self-governing structure but had al o failed to ensure New Zealand had a secure 
electricity supply. The governments Commission would not only develop a rule book for 
industry practice but would have the added role of securing supply in one in sixty dry 
180 years. 
The Commissions role in secunng supply would be based in the market. The 
Commission would not own any generation capacity; it would contract with existing 
generators to ring fence reserve energy. Reserve energy tends to have low capital, but 
high marginal costs due to the requirement that fuel is likely to be stored for long 
periods.
181 
The current market arrangements made it uneconomical to store fuel for 
shortage situations. The aim of the Commission is that the contracts will make reserve 
generation economically viable for generators to supply. When lake levels fall the 
Commission will exercise the contracts and sell electricity back through the wholesale 
market increasing supply and avoiding shortages. This is seen as a fine balancing act 
between ensuring security of supply and keeping market incentives. If the price is too low 
then the market will have less incentive to invest in base capacity, if it is set too high it 
will not be used in circumstances where it should have been. It is expected that the 
Commission will have sufficient capacity to effectively cap the price of electricity at the 
rate they release except in extremely rare circumstances. 182 In this way the Commission 
is also expected to fulfill another role in the market. The spot price of electricity has 
proven to be much more volatile than expected. In the 2003 shortage prices hit 70-cents 
per kilowatt-hour, up from the normal 6-cent per kilowatt-hour. 183 The Commission's 
role is also expected to have an element of price smoothing to avoid these huge 
variations. 
180 New Zealand Elect1icity Market, The Multi-Lateral Agreement on Quality Standards, and The Metering 
and Reconciliation lnfo1mation Agreement. See http://www.jadeworld.com/Jade ystems/csmaria.htm Last 
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While the major part of the discu sion document focused on the reserve contract 
the Commission would also have a "tool-box" of powers. This would include the power 
to require that generators hold a minimum of dry year reserves and to require that 
retailers hold long-term financial contracts. This move is likely to be a reaction to the 
2001 Post Winter review that found that retailers had failed to adequately protect 
themselves with hedge contracts. The Commission would also have the power to ensure 
that the retailers and large users have systems in place to reduce demand when spot prices 
begin to rise. 
184 
The Commissions regulatory power is not to be underestimated, there 
was a concern that the Commissions powers are broad enough to conflict with the 
Commerce Commissions. The Commission will be self-funding through a levy of about 
.5c per kilowatt-hour. 185 At present prices are around 5 cents per kilowatt-hour. 186 This 
would put the price of electricity up by about 10%. Any time that the Commission sells 
electricity on the market this money will be used to offset its future running costs. 
The Commission proposal showed that the government was prepared to get involved 
in the industry in a hands on manner. This was a major change after the focus of the last 
15 years was on how to remove government influence from the market. Soon after this 
the government announced that it would act to speed the resource consent process for a 
generation project. Meridian Energy first proposed project Aqua in 2001. Project Aqua is 
hydro generation scheme on lower Waitaki River, the system uses eight canals to link six 
hydro stations and requires diverting part of the river flow into the canals. These canal's 
will run for approximately 60 kilometer ' s. A project of this magnitude would affect 
anybody from farmers, to local iwi , to recreational user ' s of the river system. Not 
surprisingly it ran into problems gaining resource consent under Resource Management 
Act. On the 11 th September the government announced that it would " intervene in the 
process of allocating water in the Waitaki catchments, in order to ensure that local , 
regional and national needs are considered." 1 7 The government has indicated that they 
184 Ministry of Economic Development Resen ·e Generation: A Discussion Document (Wellington May 
2003) 4. 
185 Ministry of Economic Development Reserve Generation: Discussion Document (Wellington , 2003) 5. 
186 See http://www.comitfree.co.nz/ ft a/p1i ce_index.summary Last Accessed 13 Jul y 2003 
187 Minister for the Environment, Hon Marion Hobb "En vironment Minister to Call in Waitaki Water 
Applications" I I September 2003, Press Release. 
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would pa - pe ial legi lation to by-pa " th Resourc »bn:1g m nt A t. I Jr!Y th 
, ·iew ,ya - thJt building new gener::iti n apacny wa - -omething thJt outweigh d th 
benefit of re our e on -ent pro e --. It "a a mo,·e that h d :: me ommentatL r · 
comparing it to the »Iuldoon go,·ernment' legi lation to o,· nurn th Em·ironm ntal 
Court ruling that refused to allow the building of th Ivd d:1m. The onn -non 
between the e two act can be exaggerated. ho,vever it doe - -ho" the government 
avoiding establi hed ystem to pro,·ide a practical re pon et an i -ue. 
~ day after this the government relea ed it draft Poli y tatement on the El tri it,· 
Go,·ernance. The document outlined in much greater detail the role of the Commi - -ion 
and its powers. Minister of Electricity the right honorable P ter Hodg on -et ut th 
Commission's key tasks: 
ensuring 'e, Zealand's electricity uppl) 1s secure. ,,ith adequate re en e generanon for dr: 
years ; 
establishing a decision-making proces and tran mi sion pricing methodolog1 for 111, e -tment in 
the national grid; and 
improving demand-side participation in the wholesale market and con umer prote rion mea ure -. 
such as minimum terms and conditions for consumer contracts.1 8 
The aim of the Commission should be on u ing the "power of promotion and 
persuasion" to achieve these measures, but it will regulate to get required out ome if that 
is necessary.' 9 The purpose of the Commi sion is extremely broad, it appear to have 
turned into catch-all for the government policy on electricit that has no other ob, iou 
administration point. 
For consumers the Commission will work in tandem with the Mini tr of 
Consumer Affairs on a variety of measure . Firstly contract of uppl will have a 
minimum set of terms and conditions aimed at increa ing tran parency and protecting 
188 Minister of Energy, Hon Pete Hodgson "Government Policy tatement et · Agenda for e,, electnc1ty 
Commission" ( 14 September 2003) Press Relea e. 
189Ministry of Economic Development Government Policy Statement 011 Elecmc111· Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) 4. 
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consumers. The Commission will also set regulations for paying for electricity, including 
a low fixed charge option for small users, a requirement for pre-paid meters and a limit 
on bond payments required from new customers. 190 The proposals also suggest a 
requirement that a complaints system is developed that is broader than existing 
arrangements under the Electricity Complaints Commission and the Electricity Consumer 
Code of Practice. 191 
The Commissions role in security of supply is largely the same as is set out above. 
The documents main point is to release the detail of the proposed Commission. Supply is 
to be meet in 1 in 60 dry years, without the need to resort to savings campaigns and 
minimising any market distortions. 192 The decision to release electricity will be based on 
clear objective measures. Electricity will be released either when the spot price reaches 
20 cents a kilo-watt hour or the variable payments that have been contracted for, 
whichever is higher. The only exception for this will be when the lake levels enter certain 
"zones" and the spot price is not above 20 cents a kilowatt-hour. 193 These "zones" will be 
developed and published by the Commission. The "zones" are the Commissions 
estimates of minimum hydro storage levels required throughout the year to avoid a 1 in 
60 dry year. A secondary zone would provide for a conservation campaign on top of the 
release of reserve electricity. Reserve generation will initially be tightly ring fenced, but 
this will be reviewed after a period of two - three years. The proposal also recognises the 
risk that this system may provide an incentive to run hydro levels at a low level in order 
to rely on reserve generation. The Commission is expected to monitor this situation and if 
necessary request extended powers from the Minister of Energy. This could include 
powers to require generators to have a minimum of reserve generation or fuel, to force 
generators to offer minimum levels of contracts to buyers and set minimum requirements 
on retailers and users with direct grid access to maintain minimum levels of contract 
190 Ministry of Economic Development Govemment Policy Statemen t of Electricity Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) 6. 
191 Ministry of Economic Deve lopment Government Policy Statement of Electricity Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) 7. 
192 Ministry of Economic Development Government Policy Statement of Electricuy Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) 7. 
193 Ministry of Economic Development Government Polic:v Statement of Electricity Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) 10. 
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cover with generators and firm demand side arrangements. 194 The Commissions 
regulatory power will also extend to the hedge market. The hedge market has never 
operated to its full effectiveness. The Commission is now proposed to have powers under 
the Electricity Act to recommend regulations for the minimum levels of hedge contract to 
be available from generators. 
The government document expressed the view that retail competition had 
improved, with most users in major centers having a choice of electricity retailers. Even 
so retail was not as competitive as it could be. The Commissions role for retail would be 
to increase competition in retail. This could include regulation, the government has 
indicated increasing powers that the Commission has under the Electricity Act. These 
extended powers would include measures to standardise contracts on lines access and 
access to meters. It also proposes extra measures to assist retailers in swapping between 
retailers. The powers to make a minimum amount of hedge contracts available was aimed 
at diminishing generator/retail companies from charging unreasonably high prices for 
hedge contracts and preventing other retailers entering the market. 195 
Apart from those outlined above, the Commissions role also includes producing 
outcomes under this government's renewable energy and energy efficiency strategies, the 
Energy Policy Framework, the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 
and Climate Change Work Program.196 
C The Changing Role of the State. 
The proposed system has not been without its c1itic's. A major criticism is its expense. 
Taking the view that the Commission had run from 1992 to 2002 and that it had been 
194 Ministry of Economic Development Go vernment Policy Statement of Electricity Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) I 0 
195 Ministry of Economic Development Government Policy Statement of Electricity Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) 18. 
196 Ministry of Economic Development Government Policy Statement of Electricity Governance (Draft) 
(Wellington 14 September 2003) I. 
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e timat d at 700 million.
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term that the ommi ion i, a fundamental mi -rak . Tru:ipO\\ rs sub111iss1111 on th, 
Resen·e Gen 1-arion Discu sion Do 11111cm question d th ba::i:: of 1h 
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01111111ss1on: n '\\ 
''\Ve belieYe the market's bia ,, ill be to tend to dell\ er ecurit~ to" ell abO\ ea I 111 oO le, el ,, 1thout ·alls 
for consen ation if prices are allowed to balan e uppl), and demand Jnd 1f ·ontr3.-:tu3l right - 3re more 
,,;dely and specifically defined. The root cau e of the a tual la k. of re-ponsl\ene -- of the:e k.e: plant 3re 
considered to relate to the lack of inter-generator back-up contract· ( e.g. bet,, een Genest - Jnd ~ \endian) 
and the thinness of contract markets overall. and the lack. of commercial perfom1an ·e pre --ures on the stJte 
owned companies."199 
Other submissions agreed with Trustpower. The submi ion fr m the nergy Federation 
of ew Zealand stated that government ownership of generation -h uld not exceed _0° o 
of the market. 200 The Energy Federation is the ew Zealand c mmittee member or the 
World Energy Council. The submission follows the 200 I v orld nerg Ollll'il 
publication Electricity Market Design and Creation in A ia Pacific. Thi r port found 
that for a truly competitive energy market no generator hould have abo e 20° o or the 
market. 201 The submission is clear, the role of Commis ion hould be impro ing the 
current market rather than intervening. Richard Tweedie from Todd Energy upported the 
view that the market was not run competitively. "The four major generators all han; 
197 This is extremely unlikely, the elevated spot price caused by the shortage would re ult ma large amount 
of economic loss to the economy. Further this period had two I in 60 dry year , th1 mdicate that either 
this loss is unlikely to be as high in future periods, or that the problem lie 111 ba e capactt and the re en e 
generation is an extremely inefficient way to deal with this problem. 
198John oble "Solutions to Power Crisis, or Just Damage Control')" The /11depe11de111, (2 May 2003). 
Wellington 8. 
199 Trustpower Submission to Ministry of Eco110111ic Development 011 Resen·e Ce11eratum ( ubm1s ion to 
Ministry of Economic Development, June 2003) 
200 Energy Federation of ew Zealand S11b111issio11fro111 the Energy Federa/1011 of c11 • Lea/and. 
(Submission to Ministry of Economic Development, June 2003) 
201 World Energy Council Electricity Market Design ( 1999, London) ee http ://www.,,orldenergy.org/wcc-
geis/ publications/ reports/emcl/exec_summ/default.a p Last Accessed 13 July 2003 
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market power and can literally nominate any price."202 These tatements clearly agree 
with the approach of the original reforms. The government's role should be in conecting 
cunent market anangements. By implementing the Commission the government will not 
deal with the fundamental problems with the industry. 
The government themselves have been critical of the market structures. Minister 
of Finance Dr Michael Cullen stated in the media release on the announcement of the 
proposed Commission. 
"Electricity supply security has become a serious concern to the Government, business and the wider 
community. For sustainable economic growth New Zealand needs a more reliable and fairly priced supply 
of electricity than the current electricity market arrangements have delivered."203 
Where the government differs from the criticisms outlined above is that they clearly do 
not see a solution to supply security lying in fm1her deregulation and privatisation. The 
government has in fact ruled out any further asset sales .
204 The government's response to 
the security of supply is to regulate for the required outcomes. This response to market 
problems is not isolated to the electricity industry. Since 1999 Employment laws have 
been amended to reintroduce the possibility of collective bargaining,
205 a state owned 
retail bank has been set up in response to private banks poor service and accident 
insurance has been re-nationalised. Despite regularly stating that the market is preferred 
to government regulation they have continued to reverse many elements of the free 
market reforms. The situation shows a marked change in approach compared to the 
governments between 1984 and 1999. 
The best illustration of the underlying differences between the current approach 
and the approach of the reforming governments can be found in the introduction and 
202 Michael Foreman and John Redward "Who or What is to Blame and What Can Be Done?" (7 May 
2003) Th e lndependenl Wellington 5. 
203 Minister of Energy, Peter Hodgson and Ministe r of Finance Dr Michael CulleP "Electricity Commission 
Will Deliver Supply Security" 20 May 2003, Press Release. 
204 Losing Sight of the Lodestar of Economic Freedom. Wolfgang Casper. ew Zealand Business Round 
Table December 2002, 
205 The Employment Contracts Act effectively removed Collective Barga ining. 
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subsequent amendment of the Comrrerce Act by the fourth Labour Government and 
Labour-Alliance coalition. The Commerce Act was passed in 1986 to increase 
competition in newly privatised industries. Its purpose at the time was: "An Act to 
promote competition in markets within New Zealand."
206 For the reforming government 
competition and the free market became the overriding aim of all the reforms. As the 
government could only come a distant second to any competitive free market outcome its 
role was limited to removing barriers to competition such as regulation, state ownership 
or anti-competitive structures. This was an ideology-based policy that was seldom 
questioned; any undesirable results were put down to any remaining state influence or 
anti-competitive structures rather than a problem with the underlying ideology. For 
reforming governments creating competitive environments became an end of itself. This 
led to some quite extreme measures, the separation of the lines and retail companies 
being the most obvious example. In that case the reforming government saw the problem 
as lying in the structure of the market, not in the dangers of bringing the free market to 
natural monopoly assets.' When Labour was re-elected in 1999 it rejected the view that 
competition produces the best outcome at all times. In 2001 the Commerce Act was 
amended, its new purpose reads as follows: "The purpose of this Act is to promote 
competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers within New Zealand."
207 
The change is a subtle one, but is illustrative as it shows that this government expects 
competition to produce a certain result. Competition is a means to obtain a policy goal; it 
is not something that is an end in its own right. The approach is a result based one, if 
competition does not provide these results then other measures will be used. In many 
cases the government realises that the free market produces results so will primarily 
attempt to use the free market. Telecommunications, for example, is left largely to the 
free market with only the Commerce Act being used for regulation. However in 
circumstance where the free market is not operating well the government will intervene. 
Responses are usually pragmatic and designed for the problem, rather than 
predete1mined. For example service concerns in retail banking were not dealt with 
through legislation but by a state run competitor who would offer appropriate service. For 
206 Commerce Act 1986 s I 
207 Commerce Act I 986 s I A. 
electricity the government has taken a different approach. The Commission has large 
interventionist powers in order to provide what the market has not, an electricity supply 
without the regular threat of supply shortages. 208 
D Influences on the State 
This is a maJor shift in underlying government policy after 15 years of major party 
support for the free market. Part of the reason for the shift will lie in the government 
being able to see the results of the liberialstion program here and overseas. Often events 
have undermined the basis of market liberialsation. Jospeth Stiglitz, Chief Economist of 
the World Bank commented in the foreword to The New Politics a Third Way for New 
Zealand 
"This caricature of successful development - a straight recipe of open markets, free trade, unfettered capital 
flows, and minimal government intervention, all in the service of GDP goals - has largely been discredited 
in the last several years. Its shortcomings have been dramatically underscored by the successful 
development of many countries that did not heed its tenents, and by the failure of many that did." 
209 
New Zealand's approach was considered one of the most pure in the world. It was 
comparable only to those countries that were forced to reform by the International 
Monetary Fund. This change in perception of the reforms highlights one of the major 
problems in Douglas' approach to policy. If the results of reforms are meant to be the 
basis of their future acceptance, what happens if these results are unfavorable? 
New Zealand's own expenence was to show examples of the liberialisation 
process not achieving its desired results. The government has had invest money in Air 
New Zealand and the Bank of New Zealand2 10 and is currently negotiating a deal to buy 
208 Shortages have been predicted in other years apart from 1992, 200 I and 2003 . See Heat on f or 
Politicians as Another Power Crisis Looms ( 1994), D1J·-year Electricity Crisis Predicated ( 1995), Power 
Shortages Feared As Lake Levels Drop ( 1997). These are all contained in Dennis Welch " Power Without 
Responsibility" (April 19-25 2003) The Listener. 
209 Chatterjee, S. (Srikanta) The New Politics, a Third Way for New Zealand. (Dunmoore Pre , Palmerton 
01ih, 1999) Foreword. 
2 10 "From the Ashes" (5 October 2001) The Press. 
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a financially insolvent Tranz Rail.21 1 These are all fonner national assets that are central 
to New Zealand's economy that were left to the free market and would have failed 
without government support. Tranz Rail in particular seems to have been the victim of 
the market. New Zealand Rail was sold in 1993 for $328.3 Million. The company had 
$322 Millions dollars of equity immediately removed before being publicly floated. The 
original major shareholders Fay Richwhite and Wisconsin Central did very well out of 
the deal. Fay Richwhite quit the company just over a year ago for an $87 million dollar 
profit on their original $31 million dollar investment. Wisconsin quit two weeks later 
netting a $100 million dollar profit on its 37 million dollar investment. Tranz Rail 's 
lack of funds has led it to cut corners, resulting in last summers line buckling disrupting 
services. The original shareholders found that the shares they had paid over $6 dollars for 
were now worth under $1.212 The deal has cost both the New Zealand public and the 
government close to half a billion dollars and has left New Zealand's rail system in 
desperate need of infrastructure investment. Electricity, as shown, has also had its share 
of problems that have been at least influenced by the free market. The New Zealand 
experience in electricity is not unique; the Californian electricity crisis in 2001 was a 
prime example of a de-regulated electricity system not working.213 
On the other hand the government has also seen the positive aspects of the 
liberialisation of the economy, New Zealand now has continued growth, which was not 
the case in 1984, and many privatised industries now operate well. In telecommunications 
competition has lead to very cheap toll charges compared to pre-privatisation. The results 
of liberalisation have been mixed, often it has provided large benefits , in other cases there 
are the honor stories like those outlined above. It is unsurpri sing that the cunent 
approach seems to be on a case-by-case basis . Given the recent experiences with the 
electricity industry it is also unsurprising that it receives more direct intervention than 
others. 
211 Gareth Morgan "Govt Ventures Too Hi gh- Cost" (21 June 2003) The Waikato Times 23. 
212 Simon Louisson /-fas Tran::: Rail Derailed Itself? ( 19 April 2003) Hawkes Bay Today. 
213 Haas School of Business, University of Berkley " Manifesto on Ca lifornian Elec tri c ity Cri sis" see 
http ://www.haas.berkeley.edu/news/ca lifomia e lcctricity_c ris is .html las t acce sed 27 September 2003. 
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The political climate at present will also have had an influence. As New Zealand 
politicians have got use to MMP it has run much more smoothly. The house has divided 
itself fomly into left and right parts. This would cause the center-left Labour party to 
move somewhat left to gain suppo11 of minority pai1ies. This tend's to favour state 
intervention in the market. MMP certainly seems to have stopped one party from holding 
absolute power and thereby reduced the chance of "Blitzkrieg" refo1ms happening again. 
Perhaps most importantly, the "Blitzkrieg" and the free market reforms have added to a 
swing away from that era's policies by many current politicians. Just as support for free 
market reform was aided by a rejection of Muldoon's unsuccessful use of ad hoe 
inventionalism, the current reforms swing away from the previous governments 
unwavering belief in the free market and the problems associated with that. The current 
response rejects the basis of both former policies, the government does not believe it can 
"beat the market" in most case's and it does not accept that the free market can always 
provide the best result's. 
V CONCLUSION 
The state's role in regards to the electricity industry has gone through three major policy 
shifts. The first and by far the longest had the government as effectively the sole 
generator and supplier of electricity to the New Zealand market. The state was heavily 
involved in the day-to-day operation of every aspect of the industry. This system 
eventually became grossly inefficient with huge mistakes made when making investment 
decisions under the "Think Big" projects. These decisions, along with state decisions in 
other industries, created a knee jerk response to the other extreme. Heavy-handed 
government intervention had failed. Its failure, and failure of the New Zealand economy 
generally, convinced Treasury and respective Ministers of Finance that the free market 
was the best form of regulation for almost any industry in ew Zealand. For the 
electricity industry this mean a 15-year period of constant de-regulation, corporatisation, 
fragmentation and privatisation. By the 1999 the industry was unrecognisable from the 
beginning of the period. The election of the Labour lead coalition stopped this process. Its 
approach has rejected any one philosophy as being correct at all times. It has shown that 
49 
where the circumstances fit it will either leave the free market or use state regulation. 
What this means for the industry is unclear, but almost certainly it will include the 
government taking a bigger leadership rol e in the industry. 2 14 What other measures are 
taken will depend on whether electricity can run efficiently or whether there are repeats 
of the problems of the last 15 years. If the industry runs well , it will be left to operate, if it 
continues to cause problems it will face a pragmatic response by the government. 
2 14 There are still many pressing issues in the industry, the two that are likely to be looked at will be New 
Zeal and 's base capac ity and Hydro-reliance. 
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